Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. This paper is an executive summary analysis of critical issues pertinent to amending U.S.
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Page Table 1 concluded that an "operational reserve" is not sustainable over time. 3 Given the mandate for 1 reserve operationalization, it is clear that this is a requirement that will not go away. For it to work, however, laws and policy must change.
In an effort to understand the complexity of this issue, this paper will look at several key aspects of past and current service operationalization efforts. The issues and arguments presented are an "executive summary" for a very complex problem requiring much more detail and analysis than the allotted length of this paper. Through examination of the current nature of Titles 10 and 32, current and past service operationalization efforts, Reservist and Guardsman issues, and employer concerns, it will become clear that the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve's assessment on future Reserve Component operational sustainability is true. As will be seen, for operationalization to be successful, Congress must create new policies and laws that clearly define the role and expectation of an "operational reserve" force that differentiates it from the "strategic reserve", and in doing so it must create a new "operational Reservist/Guardsman" to perform this mission.
CHAPTER 1 Understanding Today's Reserve Component
In order to understand the problem with "operationalizing" the reserves, it is important to understand how current laws and policies organize, train, and equip the 118,270 soldiers. Of these, 53,000, or roughly 45%, were cross-leveled into other units. 23 The practice of cross-leveling has many negative effects. The first is its toll on morale.
Many Reserve and Guard units come from small communities whose members grew-up together, train together, and simultaneously leave families and employers behind when activated.
Mobilizing these units not only mobilizes their members, but also their entire communities.
Breaking up these units violates unit cohesion, leaves fractured communities, and decreases the readiness and cohesion of the remaining units. Struggling to meet the high operational tempo since 9/11, the Army has been encouraged to seek a better model that more efficiently fields the total force. 25 In response to this, the Army for one year in a three-year period, and deploy Reserve Component forces for one year in a sixyear window. 26 The problem with this construct, however, is that current manning levels only allow the Army roughly 16 active and 4 reserve BCTs from which to draw on each year, while the current annual utilization rate of BCTs is 23 to 24. 27 This three to four BCT shortfall is significant and will either cause the DoD to ask for either an increase in Army manning or a reduction in operational commitments, or it will necessitate a shorter period between unit deployments. Further complicating the ARFORGEN model is the fact that no manning strategy that can support ARFORGEN is in place for either the Army Reserve or National Guard. 28 The consecutive months, not 24 cumulative months as many previously though. 30 While this policy has not been directly linked to ARFORGEN, it offers a "clean slate" with regard to involuntary mobilizations, and will allow ARFORGEN to break the chaotic cycle created by cross-leveling. 
Marine Corps Total Force Integration

Navy Total Force Integration
The Navy has taken an entirely different approach to Total Force Integration than the Army and Marine Corps by conducting a personnel review to optimize reserve force structure while at the same time improving Selected Reservist accessibility to the Joint Force Commander.
In an effort to shift the preponderance of Navy resources from supporting land-based operations to supporting sea-based operations, the Chief of Naval Operations initiated a study called the "Zero Base Review" in October 2003. 40 This study looked to optimize active/reserve integration, and concluded that the Navy should decrease the size of Reserve Component from its originally authorized 85,900 personnel to roughly 70,000 by 2011. 41 This initiative has cut many unnecessary billets and created new billets as the role of the Navy has evolved in the GWOT. Currently, the Navy Reserve's end strength is down to 58,000 personnel while the Navy is reorganizing as part of this initiative.
The second component of the Navy's reserve integration plan has focused on making its Module (TRMS-NRRM), the Navy created a system for tracking reserve readiness so effective that it became "the prototype for the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)." 42,000 Reservists since 9/11, the majority of which has been in the form of individual augmentees assigned to Army units in Iraq and Afghanistan. 46 Since the majority of these mobilizations are for individuals deploying alone, the Navy has not had to deal with the negative effects of cross-leveling.
Air Force Total Force Integration
Like the Army, the Air Force has both a Reserve and National Guard. has a force generation model that provides long-term predictability. The only thing it lacks is a mechanism guaranteeing reserve force participation. If there existed a reserve enlistment contract that guaranteed 120-days of active duty service every two years, the Air Force could predictably and repeatedly operationalize these reserve and guard units in its long-term AEF plan.
Overall Assessment
While this has been a very brief look at each of the service's experiences with Total Force Integration and operationalization, it has exposed several critical points. First, during wartime operations, "boots on the ground" services like the Army and Marine Corps really need to be able to employ their reserve forces strategically, using involuntary mobilizations to activate entire units for as long as they need them. This means they need to use unlimited involuntary mobilizations under section Title 10, section 12301(a). When these strategic mobilization mechanisms are unavailable, the services must use non-strategic mechanisms that require shorter, more frequent, and unpredictable active duty periods resulting in something that looks like an operational reserve, but is in fact a fractured and dysfunctional strategic reserve.
It is also interesting to see how differently the services define operationalization. When the wars are over and budgets shrink, will the respective services continue to seek the efficiencies of Total Force Integration and operationalization? If so, will they continue to use strategic mobilization mechanisms that result in cross-leveling and volunteerism, or will they seek an improved system specifically designed for an operational reserve? These questions are addressed in the following analysis.
CHAPTER 3 Effects of Reserve Component Operationalization Employer Issues and Perspective
While each service grapples with the best approach for operationalizing its Reserve Other employers he spoke with said they will continue to support employees currently in the Guard and Reserve, but "will no longer actively seek out to hire candidates who are active" 57 in either.
Daywalt further observed that the DoD never vetted its desire for operationalization with the employers of the Guard and Reserve. Most employers understand the importance of national defense and their support is critical if Reserve Component operationalization is to succeed. The fundamental shift from strategic reserve to operational reserve is a major shift that significantly affects employers. What employers must realize, however, is that a national draft would have an even greater impact upon their employees, and the Global War on Terror is the "long war" for which sacrifices must be made. Employers could argue that it would be better policy to raise the end strength of the active duty component, but are they and the public willing to pay higher taxes to support it? One way or another, businesses will make sacrifices in support of the GWOT.
When all things are considered, it appears that the primary business concern is the uncertainty of when and how long their reserve and guard employees will serve. When looking at the alternatives of either paying higher taxes to support increased active duty end strength or reinstating the draft, employers might be receptive to operationalization so long as its impact is predictable and does not deprive them of their employees for too long or too frequently.
Reservist/Guardsmen Issues and Perspective
The final piece of the puzzle, when it comes to amending laws for operationalizing the Reserve Component, is the individual Reservist or Guardsman. To date, Reservists and
Guardsmen have participated in an operational reserve, but have they actually bought into it?
Has the DoD's effort to create an operational reserve been done without critical member buy-in, thereby creating a usable short-term operational force that will crumble as morale, retention and Stephen Duncan with regard to the type of personnel he believes would comprise a high-op tempo reserve force:
The high quality of Reservists since the mid-1980s has been due in large part to officers and non-commissioned officers who are sufficiently talented, experienced, and interested in Reserve service that they are able to pursue successful civilian careers and serve in the Reserve Components. Almost full-time service may well attract only those individuals who can't compete successfully as a career soldier, and/or those who have no or few options for a successful civilian career." 58 According to Duncan, an operational reserve force would attract substandard individuals.
Unfortunately, the statistics somewhat support Duncan's prediction, 59 which makes determining the degree of Reservist and Guardsman willingness to buy in to operationalization critical to recruiting and retaining the "talented, experienced and interested" personnel necessary for operationalization's success. Reservists, employers, the services components and Congress must consider creating an "operational" Reservist so long as it is: 1) capable of improving overall force efficiency, 2) possible to man, and 3) capable of realizing both long and short-term cost savings.
Improving Force Efficiency
Improving force efficiency is the impetus behind Total Force Integration. In an effort to optimize budgets, the services are striving to find the perfect balance of active and Reserve
Component personnel and the missions each conducts. Service force generation models such as ARFORGEN, Fleet Response Plan (FRP) and the AEF deployment cycles naturally seek economy of force. As a component of these force models, the Reserve Officers Association has proposed the concept of a frequent-use "operational" reserve unit (ORU) manned by legally defined "operational" Reservists. 65 As it currently stands, some force generation models are more conducive to the "operational" volunteerism makes predictability difficult for the services, and it increases the likelihood that some form of cross-leveling or rainbowing will need to occur. If, however, the services were able to plan around an "operational" reserve unit and "operational" Reservist/Guardsmen, the services could offer Reservists and Guardsmen predictable deployments in return for greater force efficiency.
Manning the Operational Reserve
As the ROA suggested in its recommendation for Operational Reserve Units, filling these new billets will require an entirely new level of commitment from the reserve force. As mentioned previously, Reservist and Guardsmen buy-in will be critical. Essential to the process will be deciding what Reserve and Guard units fit best into the force generation model for operationalization, and operationalizing only those whose mission is compelling enough to attract Reservists and Guardsmen willing to perform operationally. As mentioned earlier, recruiting and retention efforts have remained strong even during periods of high mobilizations.
The key will be to make sure that Reservists and Guardsmen, employers, and service leadership understand that the "operational" Reservist concept intends to protect the Reservist as much as it is to create greater force generation efficiency. Providing enlistment incentives and employer tax benefits will help sell the concept, but it will ultimately be the assurance of protection against random mobilization, guaranteed service predictability, and the opportunity to serve operationally that will appeal the most to service members.
Real Cost Savings?
Even if the services buy into the ORU concept for their force generation models, and
Reservists/Guardsmen/employers buy into the concept of an "operational" Reservists, does the cost savings described earlier really translate to an overall cost savings? Some in the Office in the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and others believe it will not.
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There are many arguments as to hidden long-term costs affiliated with operationalization. The
Center for Strategic and International Studies claims that "because of higher health care costs after age 65…a traditional drilling Reservist, at a minimum, [is] more expensive than an active duty soldier." 68 While the study also admitted that "these cost calculations have not been universally accepted", 69 they allude to the idea that, as a percentage, more Reservists eventually receive retirement benefits than do their active duty counterparts. Since "operational" Reservists would have more active duty time at retirement than traditional strategic Reservists (who may only perform active duty at the rate of one weekend per month and two weeks per year), "operational" Reservists would receive higher retirement pay. As these Reservists age and receive expensive health care benefits, their ultimate cost to the services could surpass the cost of a larger active duty force that may not have as many retirees. The costs of enlistment bonuses and employer tax incentives mentioned in the previous section are other factors that could minimize the short-term labor cost benefits of the "operational" Reservists.
Just as there will be "hidden" long-term and short-term costs, there are also hidden savings that may result from the creation of an "operational" Reservist. Efficiencies in force generation that result from reserve "operationalization" may even enable the services to decommission active duty units. Increased operational use will also mean increased levels of readiness and training, which is a benefit that may not easily equate to dollars. Like all processes, there will be trade-offs. These hidden costs and hidden savings that will definitely require a greater level of analysis before Congress should change any laws. For now, the shortterm cost savings appear to be real, especially when intangibles such as improved overall combat effectiveness are also considered.
Assessing Future Requirements
Integrating the Reserve Component into an even greater operational role via ORUs and "operational" Reservists makes sense given today's requirements. This analysis would be remiss, however, if it did not consider the COCOM role in operationalization. As COCOM requirements and need for support decrease, will the need for operationalization decrease with it?
After all, as COCOM requirements decrease so will the need for deployments. Fewer deployments mean fewer units necessary to complete force generation requirements. If this is the case, does operationalization even need to be sustainable for the long-term? Perhaps the efficiencies derived from operationalization will encourage a regular component end-strength decrease as requirements subside. This is the subject for an entirely different paper, but it is definitely a consideration factor for evaluating operationalization's long-term applicability.
CONCLUSION
Given the fact that operationalizing the Reserve Component is a mandate, the services will need to either figure how to accomplish it using the current laws contained in U.S. Code
Title 10 and 32 or push Congress to amend the laws to make them more suitable for long-term In creating the legal framework that defines the "operational" Reservist and Guardsman, it will be important to remember the social compact between services and their citizen soldiers.
Changing the laws contained in U.S. Code Title 10 and 32 to provide mechanisms for using the Reserve Component in a more operational role will require a new social compact with buy-in from employers, the services and the citizen-soldier. At an individual level, some Reservists will prefer to be operational, while others will prefer strategic service. For the services, this compact will give them a level of certainty for force generation providing greater efficiencies and reduced personnel costs while still maintaining a strategic reserve. For employers, it will provide predictability to employee absences that has been missing for a while. For all, it will provide the missing mechanisms necessary for alleviating many demoralizing problems of the past.
